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I. INTRODUCTION
To what extent have the laws, institutions, policies, and ideologies
of the colonial state survived the end of colonial rule? These
questions about “colonial continuity” have been of great interest to
scholars of post-colonial legal systems. 1 Questions about colonial
*Arudra Burra (burra@hss.iitd.ac.in) is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in
the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Indian Institute of
Technology-Delhi (IIT Delhi). He has a Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton
University (2011), and a J.D. from the Yale Law School (2007). Before joining IIT
Delhi, he was a post-doctoral fellow at the Program in Law and Philosophy at the
UCLA Law School.
1. See, e.g., Sandipto Dasgupta, A Language Which is Foreign to Us:
Continuities and Anxieties in the Making of the Indian Constitution, 34 COMP.
STUD. S. ASIA, AFR. & MIDDLE E. 228, 228 (2014) (stating that colonial continuity
plays a central role in a nation which transitions to postcolonial constitutionalism).
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continuity also play a role in normative criticism of contemporary
laws and institutions, since the origins of a law or institution within
the colonial state are often used to attack their presence in the postcolonial state. This article argues that, despite its ubiquity in
academic and political discourse, the concept of “colonial
continuity” can obscure thinking about post-colonial laws and
institutions in important ways. This is because the category of the
“colonial” is itself a problematic conceptual category when applied
to laws and institutions in India’s colonial past.
There are at least three ways in which the term “colonial
continuity” (or some cognate term, such as “colonial inheritance” or
“colonial legacy”) figures in contemporary discourse. In the first
sense it is used to explain or diagnose some present-day ill. 2
Sometimes this diagnosis involves an exercise of shifting blame. Dr.
B. R. Ambedkar warned against in his famous closing address to the
Constituent Assembly, in which he said “[b]y independence, we have
lost the excuse of blaming the British for anything going wrong. If
hereafter things go wrong, we will have nobody to blame except
ourselves.” 3 This point has been echoed more recently by scholars
such as Andre Béteille. 4
Colonial continuities are also invoked to criticise contemporary
laws and institutions: the fact that an institution or law is a “colonial
inheritance” is sometimes taken to be a reason to get rid of it, or to
alter its character. 5 Thus, one of the challenges to section 377 of the
2. Cf. Anil Kalhan et al., Colonial Continuities: Human Rights, Terrorism,
and Security Laws in India, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 93, 125 (2006) (claiming the
extraordinary legal procedures India uses in non-emergency situations can be
traced to colonial policies for preventing security threats).
3. The Constituent Assembly of India, Debate on the Government of India
Act (Amendment) Bill (Nov. 25, 1949) (transcript available at
http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/ls/debates/vol11p11.htm).
4. See Andre Béteille, Constitutional Morality, ECON. & POL. WKLY., Oct. 4–
10, 2008 at 35 (“[M]ost [Constituent Assembly members] had by then acquired the
convenient habit of attributing every Indian misfortune to the misdeeds of colonial
rule. It does not speak well of us to shift the burden of responsibility for all our
contradictions and dilemmas on to some external agency, acting either directly or
indirectly though forces over which we ourselves never seem to acquire control.”).
5. A criticism which has been applied to the constitution as a whole. See
Rohit De, Constitutional Antecedents, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE INDIAN
CONSTITUTION [hereinafter De, Constitutional Antecedents] (noting the criticism
that the Indian constitution was merely a “slavish imitation” of Western
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Indian Penal Code (criminalizing sexual activities “against the order
of nature”) – has been that it is a “vestige of the colonial order.” 6
Interestingly, this form of political argument is compatible with a
range of political ideologies. Thus, at the other end of the ideological
spectrum from Naz Foundation, the chief of the Hindu rightwing
group, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (“RSS”) in 2000
denounced the Constitution as a whole as no more than a
continuation of the Government of India Act, 1935, a colonial
statute. 7
A third use of the term “colonial continuity” concerns the survival
within the post-colonial state of institutions such as the police or the
civil service. 8 These institutions were instruments of colonial control
and repression and had a long history of conflict with the nationalist
movement. Yet this nationalist movement, whose criticism of
colonial rule rested in part on a criticism of these institutions, chose
to retain them after the end of colonial rule. This attempt to fulfill
post-colonial ambitions through what one commentator called “the
trained servants of imperialism” has seemed to some scholars to be a
paradox or puzzle to be explained. 9
This puzzle, in turn, leads to a lament: given the history of this
anti-colonial opposition to colonial institutions, their survival into the
post-colonial state is seen then as a political failure. Indeed, the
failure of the post-colonial state to live up to some of its ambitions
has in turn been attributed to the colonial origins of some of its
institutions, thus leading us back to the first use of the term “colonial
constitutions).
6. Naz Foundation vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., civil writ petition
7455/2001. Many thanks to Siddharth Narrain for making the petitions available.
In written submissions to the Court, the Alternative Law Forum argued that “while
disgust and revulsion may have been a valid ground for colonial rulers to legislate
by decree, it is clearly not the case in a civilized society governed by a
Constitution.” Id.
7. Sumit Sarkar, Indian democracy: the historical inheritance in THE
SUCCESS OF INDIA’S DEMOCRACY 23, 25 (Atul Kohli ed., 1966); see also De,
Constitutional Antecedents, supra note 5, at 1-2.
8. See generally DAVID ARNOLD, POLICE POWER AND COLONIAL RULE:
MADRAS 1859-1947 (1986); DAVID C. POTTER, INDIA’S POLITICAL
ADMINISTRATORS: 1919-1983 (1986).
9. Seminarist, “Self before Service,” Seminar 84 (1966), quoted in POTTER,
supra note 8, at 2. See ARNOLD, supra note 8, at 185 (context of the police);
POTTER, supra note 8, at 2 (context of the Indian Civil Service).

140

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[31:2

continuity” described above. 10
This article argues that the persistence of institutions such as the
police and the bureaucracy seems puzzling only against the
background of a nationalist narrative in which Indian independence
is seen through the lens of conflict with the institutions of colonial
rule. If the battle was fought (in part) to get rid of the institutions,
then their persistence is a sign of defeat. 11
This nationalist narrative takes the history of the anti-colonial
movement to be primarily one of extra-constitutional conflict
between the Congress and the British Raj, – particularly during the
Gandhi-led mass agitations of 1919, 1930-31, and 1942. 12 In Part II,
this article argues that this narrative obscures important periods of
pre-1947 constitutional history which involved the nationalist
leadership in the role of a constitutional party working within the
framework of the colonial state.
This point is illustrated by two case-studies involving the
workings of the Congress Ministries elected under the 1935
Government of India Act (“India Act”). On both the legislative and
executive sides the nationalist leadership worked within a framework
established (and confined) by the colonial state. But during this
period legislatures (elected on the basis of an admittedly limited
franchise) did pass laws and the Ministries did have some limited
control over the police and the bureaucracy. 13 Were the laws passed
by these legislatures or the executive decisions made by these
Ministries “colonial” laws or not? To ask the question is to see that
the colonial versus anti-colonial (and therefore the colonial versus
post-colonial) framework is inadequate to describe the constitutional
history of the late-colonial state.

10. See POTTER, supra note 8; Kalhan et al., supra note 2, at 112 (quoting a
former police officer as saying that “the Raj lives on” in the police institutions of
contemporary India).
11. See Arudra Burra, The Cobwebs of Imperial Rule, SEMINAR 615, Nov.
2010, 79, 79-80 [hereinafter Burra, Cobwebs] (noting once independence was
attained, many members previously serving under the British Raj became
important contributors to the new regime).
12. See generally CONGRESS & THE RAJ: FACETS OF THE INDIAN STRUGGLE
1917-47 1-46 (D.A. Low ed., 1977).
13. ARNOLD, supra note 8, at 185.
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Part III extends this argument and claims that even in the colonial
period these institutions of the police, the bureaucracy, and the
Courts had a life which was to some extent autonomous of their
origins within the colonial state and of their role in suppressing the
nationalist movement. Thus the interests of the colonial state in
maintaining colonial power did not always align with the interests of
the institutions through which this power was to be retained. This
claim is illustrated by two case-studies, one involving a conflict
between the Federal Court of India and the Executive regarding
wartime legislation curbing civil liberties, and the other involving
conflict within the Indian Civil Service regarding the best way to
implement the 1935 Act. 14
The fact that there were conflicts both between as well as within
colonial institutions 15 suggest that the fact that they were institutions
of the colonial state did not entirely determine how they functioned.
To understand their functioning we must also understand their nature
as institutions, governed by values and norms which might not
always serve the interests of the colonial state. Thus to describe these
merely as “colonial” is to locate them exclusively in the nationalist
narrative of continuous conflict described above. But this tells less
about their functioning than one might initially think. Paying
attention to them as institutions which saw themselves as to some
extent “politically neutral” gives an additional purchase on
understanding their persistence into the post-colonial state; there is a
logic of institutional continuity which is to some extent independent
of the logic of control over political power.
It should be emphasized that the primary aim of using these
historical examples is not to make a historical point about the nature
14. On the Federal Court see Rohit De, Emasculating the Executive: The
Federal Court and Civil Liberties in Late Colonial India, in THE LEGAL COMPLEX
IN POSTCOLONIAL STRUGGLES FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM 27-30 (Terrence C.
Halliday et al. eds., 2012) (highlighting how the Federal Court over-ruled curbs on
civil liberties under the Defence of India Rules, 1939) [hereinafter De,
Emasculating the Executive]. On the Indian Civil Service, see POTTER, supra note
8, at 50-56.
15. See De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 27-30 (highlighting
how the Federal Court supported civil liberties during wartime, through
invalidating government regulations on preventive detention, not allowing special
criminal courts, and reading down the law of sedition in order to restrict its
application); POTTER, supra note 8, at 2.
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of colonial rule, but rather to make a conceptual point about the best
ways of describing that rule, at least in the late-colonial period. The
claim is that the category “colonial” is not always a helpful term
through which to do so, particularly when applied to laws and
institutions. In questioning the importance of this category and
thereby undermining the colonial versus nationalist binary, this
article makes a contribution to what Arvind Elangovan has described
as the task of providing a non-nationalist understanding of Indian
constitutional history. 16

II. CONSTITUTIONAL COOPERATION VERSUS
EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT: THE
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT, 1935
Maurice Duverger draws a helpful distinction between conflict
“within a regime” as opposed to conflict “about a regime.” 17 Both
sorts of conflict are evident in the debates around the Government of
India Act, 1935. 18 But while the overall arc of the nationalist reading
of pre-1947 history emphasizses conflict about the regime, this frame
does not sit well with the experience of the elected Congress
Ministries in 1935-37. This section describes some elements of
constitutional history that are better seen as instances of conflict – or
perhaps even cooperation – within the regime.
The regime in question was the result of a long period of
constitutional reform and review starting with what came to be called
the “Simon Commission” Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms
and culminating with a period of revision and adaption of the
existing laws of British India to bring them into conformity with the
new Constitution.19 The Constitutional framework of the India Act
16. Arvind Elangovan, The Making of the Indian Constitution: A Case for a
Non-nationalist Approach, 12 HISTORY COMPASS, 1-10 (2014). Thanks to Rohit
De for emphasizing the importance of restricting the argument of this article to the
late-colonial state. In De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 74, De
also claims that “the judges and decisions of the Federal Court challenge any neat
categorization into the nationalist/colonial binary.”
17. See MAURICE DUVERGER, THE IDEA OF POLITICS: THE USES OF POWER IN
SOCIETY (1966). Thank you to Professor Andre Beteille for drawing attention to
this work.
18 See The Government of India Act, 1935, 26 Geo. 5, c. 2 (U.K.).
19. INDIAN STATUTORY COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE INDIAN STATUTORY
COMMISSION xii (1930) (stating the purpose of the Commission is to inquire into

2016]

WHAT IS “COLONIAL”

143

divided legislative powers into federal, provincial and concurrent
lists (a scheme which survives in the present Indian constitution).20
The federal lists included subjects such as defense, external affairs,
currency, and customs, while the Provinces were to legislate on
topics such as public order, public health, education, agriculture and
excise; the concurrent legislative list dealt with issues such as
criminal law and procedure, censorship, bankruptcy, and labor. 21
Governors of the Provinces and the Governor-General at the
Centre were advised by Ministries chosen from legislatures elected
on the basis of a restricted franchise, with seats reserved for different
communities. 22 But Ministerial control at both levels were hedged in
with a number of caveats. 23 In the Centre, the Governor-General
retained discretionary power over defense and external affairs and
did not have to consult his ministers on these subjects. 24
In addition there were a number of areas for which he had a
“special responsibility” 25 and in respect of which he had the right to
exercise his “individual judgment.” 26 Amongst these “special
responsibilities” were the prevention of “grave menace to the peace

the working system of government, growth of education, and the development of
representative institutions). See Arvind Elangovan, Provincial Autonomy, Sir
Benegal Narsing Rau and an Improbable Imagination of Constitutionalism in
India, 1935-38 in 36 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA AFR. & MIDDLE E. 66-82 (2016) for an
account of the process of adapting the laws of British India to bring them in line
with the 1935 Act. B. N. Rau, who played an important part in this process, went
on to become the Adviser to the Constituent Assembly, where he played a crucial
role in drafting the Constitution of independent India. See id.
20. See The Government of India Act, 1935. For the complaint that the
present-day constitution borrowed too much from the 1935 Act, see De,
Constitutional Antecedents, supra note 5.
21. See De, Constitutional Antecedents, supra note 5, at 303-08; KEITH B.
ARTHUR, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF INDIA 1600-1935 (1936); REGINALD
COUPLAND, THE INDIAN PROBLEM: REPORT ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM IN
INDIA 143, 151 (1944).
22. See 1935 Government of Indian Act, supra note 20, at 247 (stating each
territorial constituency had an electoral roll which listed who could vote, based
partly on their age, competency, ethnic, and religious background).
23. See id. at 8.
24. See id. (noting that while the Governor-General had authority in regards to
defence and external affairs, he did not have discretionary power when it came to
matters regarding the Federation and the Majesty’s dominions).
25. Id. at 8-9.
26. Id. at 9.
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or tranquility of India,” 27 the “safeguarding of legitimate minority
interests,” 28 and the “safeguarding of financial stability or credit.” 29
In these areas he was to consult his Ministers, but was not bound to
act upon their advice. 30 The Act also circumscribed the powers of the
legislatures in terms of the subjects over which they could make
laws: for instance, the federal legislature was not allowed to vote on
matters concerning federal revenues, including the salaries of the
Governor-General, or on expenditure on defensce and external
affairs. Similar restrictions applied to the Provinces. 31
The 1935 Act was treated by a great deal of skepticism from a
range of nationalist Indian opinion. Sir C. Y. Chintamani, a moderate
liberal, wrote of it as an “anti-India Act;” Congress leaders were
more forthright in calling it a “slave constitution” and a “charter of
bondage.” 32 In a pamphlet on the Constitution, Kunwar Muhammad
Ashraf, a member of the Congress and later of the Communist Party,
wrote “. . . it is obvious that the New Constitution does not in any
way affect the basic political relationship between India and Great
Britain.” 33 The keystone of the imperialist domination of the country
is to remain intact and India is to continue, as a subject country, to be
ruled and exploited by an alien imperialist Government.” 34
Despite these criticisms, the Congress chose to contest the 1937
elections and then to form ministries after forming absolute
majorities in five out of eleven provinces (Madras, Bihar, Orissa,

27. 1935 Government of Indian Act, supra note 20, at 8.
28. Id. at 9.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 8 (claiming that the Governor General had control over the
minister’s salaries and the conditions of their service).
31. See id. at 35 (emphasizing the executive authority for each province is only
allowed to impact the areas of society which the Legislature of the Province has
power to affect).
32. W.H. MORRIS-JONES, PARLIAMENT IN INDIA 61 (1957).
33. Z.A. Ahmad, Congress Political and Economic Studies-No. I: A Brief
Analysis of the New Constitution 3 (1937), quoted in Arvind Elangovan, Provincial
Autonomy, Sir Benegal Narsing Rau and an Improbable Imagination of
Constitutionalism in India, 1935-38I, 36 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA AFR. & MIDDLE E.
66, 66-82 (2016).
34. Arvind Elangovan, Provincial Autonomy, Sir Benegal Narsing Rau and an
Improbable Imagination of Constitutionalism in India, 1935-38, 36 COMP. STUD.
S. ASIA AFR. & MIDDLE E. 66, 66-82 (2016) (describing the nationalist opposition
to the Act, only the Muslim League was cautiously optimistic about its prospects).
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Central Provinces, and UP) and a near majority in Bombay. 35 These
Ministries were to stay in office for two years, until they resigned en
masse in October 1939 to protest the Viceroy’s unilateral decision to
associate India with the Allied war against Germany. 36 In these two
years, as Sumit Sarkar puts it, “over the major part of the country, the
persecuted of yesterday had become ministers, the new assemblies
met to the strains of the Bande Mataram, and the national flag for
which so many had faced lathis and bullets flew proudly over public
buildings.” 37
But Sarkar also points out the “paradoxical” nature of this choice
to participate in the 1935 Act – a paradox which prefigures the later
paradox of colonial continuity:
[a] party committed to Purna Swaraj and bitterly critical of the 1935
Constitution working within its framework, with powers limited by
official reservations and safeguards as well as by restricted financial
resources, and having to implement decisions through a civil service and a
police with which its relations had so long been extremely hostile. 38

While the Congress had initially decided to take charge of
Provincial Ministries in order to obstruct the working of the Act
“from within,” in fact, even skeptical British observers were
surprised at the legislative and administrative record of the Congress
ministries. 39 Amongst the first acts of the Congress ministries was to
release political prisoners, 40 cancel orders curbing civil liberties
under repressive legislation, 41 and in some cases to repeal such
legislation altogether – for instance the special Emergency Powers
Act of 1932 in Bombay 42 and the Public Safety Act of 1930 in Bihar
and Orissa. 43
A number of Provinces also passed legislation on agrarian and
other social issues. For instance, in 1938 the Provincial Ministry of
35. SUMIT SARKAR, MODERN INDIA 1885-1887 349 (1983) [hereinafter
SARKAR, MODERN].
36. See id.
37. See id. at 351.
38. See id. at 351.
39. See MORRIS-JONES, supra note 32, at 65-67.
40. See SARKAR, MODERN, supra note 35, at 352.
41. See id.
42. Act No. 9, Acts of Parliament, 1933 (India).
43. COUPLAND, supra note 21, at 116.
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Orissa passed, inter alia, the Orissa Co-operative Land Mortgage
Bank Act, 44 the Orissa Small Holders Relief Act, 45 and the Orissa
Nurse and Midwives Registration Act. 46 In the same year, the Bihar
legislature passed the Bihar Money-lenders (Amendment) Act, the
Bihar Prohibition Act, and the Bihar Agricultural Income-tax Act. 47
Were the executive acts of these Ministries and the legislation
passed by the Provincial Assemblies “colonial”? They were certainly
colonial-era acts. But they were, after all, the constitutional actions
of elected members of a political party that saw itself leading the
extra-constitutional nationalist agitation against British rule. Yet the
constitutional framework within which they operated was one which
many observers thought had been designed to perpetuate colonial
rule, not to end it. 48
If the term “colonial” is used not just to designate a historical
period, but also to designate some particular aspect of that period
(defined, for instance, by an opposition to the anti-colonial
movement), then it is not easy to describe the working of the Act as
either colonial or anti-colonial. And if the identification of these Acts
as colonial is problematic, then their identification postIndependence as colonial continuities is surely problematic as well.
What are we to make of the fact that, say, the Bihar Prohibition Act
continued in operation beyond 1947? Is it an example of a “colonial
continuity”? This question does not seem to have a straightforward

44. See Orissa Co-operative Land Mortgage Bank Act, 1938, No. 3, Orissa
Acts, 1938 (India) (granting long terms loans to landowners for a variety of
individualized purposes, including agricultural improvements).
45. See Orissa Small Holders Relief Act, 1938, No. 5, Orissa Acts, 1938
(India) (rendering temporary debt relief to individual landowners who use their
land for agriculture).
46. See Orissa Nurses and Midwives Registration Act, 1938, No. 7, Orissa
Acts, 1938 (India) (rendering better training to nurses, midwives, and health
visitors).
47. MATHA SHRU, THE BIHAR MONEY-LENDERS ACT: BEING BIHAR ACTS III
OF 1938 & VII OF 1939 (1965); THE BIHAR PROHIBITION ACT, 1938 (BIHAR ACT VI
OF 1938); THE BIHAR AGRICULTURAL INCOME-TAX ACT, 1938.
48. This was, for instance, the view of Lord Linlithgow, the Viceroy, who
thought the Act was the best way to maintain British influence in India: “It is no
part of our policy, I take it . . . gratuitously to hurry the handing over the controls
to Indian hands at any pace faster that that which we regard as best calculated, on a
long view, to hold India to the Empire.” See SARKAR, MODERN, supra note 35, at
338.
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answer: there are interesting jurisprudential and constitutional
questions in the neighborhood, but these tend not to be the questions
of interest to those who raise the question of colonial continuities as
either paradox or lament.
Turning to the issue of conflict versus cooperation, consider the
relation between the Congress Ministries and two arms of the
colonial state which were clearly associated with the maintenance of
the British Raj: the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the police. The
ICS had played an important role in the suppression of the civil
disobedience movements of 1930 to 1933. 49 ICS officers were at the
forefront of formulating Government policy against the movement
and advocated a much harsher response to it than either the Viceroy
or the Secretary of State. 50 They played an important role in directing
the suppression of the movement on the ground. 51 They had great
discretionary powers, as well as civilian control over the police,
which was accused of several excesses during this period. 52 And
much of their work consisted in specifically political activity directed
against the Congress.
The anti-Congress aspect of this activity was great enough to make
the Governor of the United Provinces, Harry Haig, worry in 1932 of
“the dangers in a development which would link official activities
too closely with a political anti-Congress party of the future . . . . If
in the politics of the new constitution . . . . officials are regarded as
definitely anti-Congress, we cannot be surprised if Congress are very

49. For more on the ICS role during the civil disobedience movement, see D.
A. Low, “Civil martial law”: the Government of India and the Civil Disobedience
Movements 1930-34 in CONGRESS AND THE RAJ, supra note 12. See also T.H.
Beaglehole, From Rulers to Servants: The I.C.S. and the British Demission of
Power in India, 11 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 237, 252 (1977) (maintaining a policy
whereby an organization which poses a threat through violent rhetoric or a desire
to break the law were targeted for dissolution).
50. See Arudra Burra, The ICS and the Raj: 1919–50 (2007) (unpublished
monograph) (on file with author); Arudra Burra, The Indian Civil Service and the
nationalist movement: neutrality, politics and continuity, 48 COMMONWEALTH &
COMP. POL. 404-32 (2010).
51. See id.
52. Lord Willingdon, the Viceroy, was unsympathetic: “Most of our officials
have had a pretty rough time from the Congress party in the last two or three years
and it may be that in some cases they are getting some of their own back.” See
Low supra note 49, at 225-58.
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definitely anti-official.” 53 Fears about the “anti-official” possibilities
of Congress rule under the Government of India Act, 1935 led to a
demand from the services for constitutional safeguards to protect
themselves from possible victimization by Congress Ministries. 54
These demands were successful, leading to an unprecedented level of
constitutional protection for the rights of civil servants, 55 which
themselves aroused a great deal of nationalist resentment. 56
And yet, on the whole, relations between the services and the
Ministries were cordial, a fact acknowledged by even so skeptical a
commentator as Coupland. 57 Consider the example of the Congress
Ministry in Madras under the Premiership of C. Rajagopalachari
(also known as Rajaji), later Minister of Home Affairs in
independent India. As Potter puts it, the working of the Act did not
suggest a complete transfer of power from the ICS to the Indian
ministers: while the ICS secretaries had a great deal of say over
minor matters of policy with respect to their generally more
inexperienced Ministers, in major policy matters Rajaji had the final
say. 58 But here, according to one ICS officer, he tended to side with
his ICS Secretaries rather than his Ministerial colleagues, saying that
he had much more confidence in the former than in the latter. 59
David Arnold paints a similar picture with respect to the situation
of the Indian Police Service in Madras was similar. 60 The police had
been on the front lines of colonial repression of nationalist agitation,
who were “castigated and condemned for their violent and ‘arbitrary’
conduct,” and in the years leading up to the adoption of the new
Constitution, they too had expressed concern over possible
victimization and had secured some safeguards under the Act. 61 But
these concerns proved unwarranted, for in Rajagopalachari they
53. Beaglehole, supra note 49, at 254.
54. See id. at 251 (claiming that there was a belief that areas of administration
may be handed over to the Ministries at a later point in time than the transfer of
political authority).
55. See id. at 254-55.
56. See id. at 254-55.
57. E.g., Burra, Cobwebs, supra note 11, at 79-80. See also COUPLAND, supra
note 21, at 118-20.
58. POTTER, supra note 8, at 48-49.
59. See ARNOLD, supra note 8, at 216-17.
60. See id. at 185.
61. See id. at 212.
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found a protector rather than an opponent: in his first Budget in 1937
he asked that the police grant be passed without dissent, requesting
that no “harsh language” be employed towards the Police in the
process. 62 In his second Budget speech, in March 1938, he urged
MLAs to try to understand those who performed “the most difficult
and the most unappreciated part” of the work of government, and
urged them and the public to put aside past “prejudices” against the
police. 63
This attitude did not endear Rajagopalachari to some of his
Congress colleagues, who regretted that those “who were hitherto
speaking the language of independence and struggle have begun to
speak the language of ‘Law and Order’ of the old regime.” 64 This
“law and order” mentality was particularly evident in matters
concerning labor unrest, in which the administration sided with the
employers (Rajaji was notable for his anti-communist views). 65
Called by the all-India Congress leadership to defend themselves
against charges of “repression” following police violence against
strikers in 1938, the Minister of Information claimed that the
Government had followed the “normal procedure that has to be
followed by any Government charged with the maintenance of law
and order.” 66
Indeed, this resemblance to the old regime was evident in other
areas as well. 67 In 1937 Rajagopalachari ordered a prosecution for
seditious speeches under the Press Act of 1931, 68 which had been
formulated by the British Government for use against the civil
disobedience movement. 69 He used the Criminal Procedure Code to
forbid the opening of a factory during a strike, 70 as well as the
Criminal Law Amendment Act to clamp down on an agitation
regarding the Government’s language policy. 71
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See id. at 217.
See id.
See ARNOLD, supra note 8, at 213-14.
See id.
See id. at 223-25.
For what follows, see Coupland’s somewhat gleeful account. See
COUPLAND, supra note 21, at 133-34.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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While Rajagopalachari’s attitude was not uncriticised within the
Congress, it is clear that it had at least the tacit approval of the
Party’s “high command.” Consider this remarkable resolution passed
by the All-India Congress Committee in 1938:
Inasmuch as people, including a few Congressmen, have been found in
the name of civil liberty to advocate murder, arson, looting and class war
by violent means, and several newspapers are carrying on a campaign of
falsehood and violence calculated to incite the readers to violence and to
lead to communal conflicts, the Congress warns the public that civil
liberty does not cover acts of, or incitements to, violence or promulgation
of palpable falsehoods. Inspite, therefore, of the Congress policy of civil
liberty remaining unchanged, the Congress will, consistently with its
tradition, support measures that may be undertaken by the Congress
Governments for the defence of life and property. 72

Notice how much easier it is to talk of some of Rajagopalachari’s
actions as “colonial,” though they had exactly the same constitutional
status as, for instance, the act of releasing political prisoners
elsewhere in India. Thus, as a term of constitutional art, the term
“colonial” applies equally to the release of political prisoners on the
one hand and to the prosecution for seditious speeches on the other.
If the term “colonial” seems more easily applicable to prosecutions
for sedition, then it is not being used in a purely descriptive sense,
but stands in for something more normatively loaded – a synonym
for “authoritarian” or “oppressive,” perhaps. Notice, though, that
authoritarian and oppressive regimes are not necessarily colonial in
their origins.
On the historical side, three points are worth emphasizing. First,
despite an initial opposition to the Government of India Act, 1935,
the story of the working of the elected Ministries was not one of
continuous conflict with the Raj; indeed, elected Ministries had to
depend upon the civil service and the police to carry out their own
policies. 73 The “Founding Fathers” who debated the shape of the new
polity thus had some experience – not all of it negative – of the
instruments of the old polity which they were eventually to retain. 74

72. See COUPLAND, supra note 21, at 134.
73. See generally ARNOLD, supra note 8; POTTER, supra note 8.
74. See generally ARNOLD, supra note 8; POTTER, supra note 8.
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The point could be made more broadly. Austin points out, for
instance, that Patel’s extensive experience with section 299 of the
Government of India Act, 1935 (governing the acquisition of
property for public purposes) played a crucial role in determining the
eventual shape of the right to property in Article 31 of the 1950
Constitution.75 In a similar vein, Morris-Jones points out an argument
in favor of a Westminster-style Parliamentary system put forward by
K. M. Munshi in the Constituent Assembly. 76 One of his claims was
that a Parliamentary system was better suited to Indian conditions,
because Parliamentary traditions had by now become familiar. 77
Second, nationalist narratives of the framing of the Constitution
tend to focus on the role of the Congress as an extra-constitutional
anti-colonial movement; it is that history which is continuously
referred to in the Constituent Assembly Debates. 78 What this leaves
out is the history of the Congress Party as a sometime constitutional
holder of political power in the Provinces, both in the period 19371939 as well as in 1946, when the Congress Ministries were reinstated. 79 There are some state interests – such as the maintenance
of law and order – which are simply state interests, whether the state

75. See GRANVILLE AUSTIN, THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION: CORNERSTONE OF A
NATION 118-25 (1966).
76. See MORRIS-JONES, supra note 32, at 87-88 (focusing on the stronger
executive in the British system, as well as Indian familiarity with parliamentary
democracy after a century of British rule).
77. Id. (“For the last thirty or forty years some kind of responsibility has been
introduced in the governance of this country. Our constitutional traditions have
become parliamentary, and we have now all our provinces functioning more or less
on the British model . . . . After this experience, why should we go back upon the
tradition that has been built for over a hundred years and try a novel experiment
framed 150 years ago and found wanting even in America?”).
78. See AUSTIN, supra note 75, at 8-9; SARBANI SEN, THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIA: POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATIONS 27 (2007)
(emphasizing the fact that the Assembly embodied Indian revolutionary principles
and was not created by the British Parliament).
79. It is likely that Congress’ role as the party in power during the
deliberations of the Constituent Assembly played a significant, and as yet
underexplored, role in the formation of the Constitution. Austin does recognize
that the government formed the “third point” of a tight triangle (the other two
being the Constituent Assembly and the Congress Party). See AUSTIN, supra note
75, at 8-9. However, Austin says little about the fact that so many of the important
figures in the Assembly also held positions in Nehru’s Cabinet. For a list of some
of these figures and the positions they held see AUSTIN, supra note 75, at 19.
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in question is a colonial or a post-colonial one. 80
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, so long as one is in the
business of exercising state power, one will have to rely on
institutions such as the bureaucracy and the police. It is part of the
nature of these institutions to be in some respects “neutral” with
respect to politics, to serve their political masters irrespective of
ideology, as long as one is functioning in a broadly constitutional
framework. 81 The post-Independence decision to retain many of the
institutions of colonial rule, such as the bureaucracy, the police, and
the army, had a great deal to do with their recognition of the fact that
they were supposed to be, and thought themselves to be, in some
sense loyal to the constitutional structure no matter who was in
charge of it. 82
When questions about the persistence of colonial institutions are
framed in terms of the puzzle of colonial continuity, one tends to
leave out the fact that the institutions in questions were institutions.
The fact that they were originally formed for the purposes of
supporting colonial rule, and played a role in sustaining it, does not
automatically disqualify them serving under an anti-colonial regime.
This article revisits this point in Part III.

80. The interesting question in India and elsewhere is why a post-colonial state
would interpret “law and order” in the particularly repressive way reminiscent of
the colonial power it replaced. Cf. DUVERGER, supra note 17, at 176.
81. See STEPHEN P. COHEN, THE INDIAN ARMY: THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE
DEVELOPMENT OF A NATION 1, 195 (1990) (“To officers (in the Indian Army at
least) profession comes first, and ‘politics’ finds no place.”)
82. See generally Arudra Burra, The Indian Civil Service and the Nationalist
Movement: Neutrality, Politics, and Continuity, 48 COMMONWEALTH AND COMP.
POL. 404, 405, 419 (2010) (quoting an officer in the army that said recruits who
were politically active before joining were considered undesirable); COHEN, supra
note 81, at 165-68 (discussing a similar point in connection with the Indian Army);
Kalhan et al., supra note 2, at 111-12 (noting that, after independence, no
significant changes were made to the way the police force functioned); B.B.
MISRA, THE BUREAUCRACY IN INDIA: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF
DEVELOPMENT UP TO 1947, 359 (1977) (arguing the merits of a separation between
the government and the civil service).
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III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND
INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY WITHIN THE
COLONIAL STATE
In Part II, it was argued that the term “colonial” is difficult to
apply in those periods of pre-1947 which were characterized by
constitutional cooperation rather than extra-constitutional conflict.
This section highlights another difficulty with the use of the term
“colonial” in the pre-1947 era—the fact that the colonial state was
not a unitary entity. There were disagreements between the
Provincial Governments and the Government of India and between
the Government of India and the Secretary of State. Similarly, there
were disagreements between different organs of the State at
particular points of time: for instance, between the executive and the
judiciary. Even if these conflicts ended in favor of laws and policies
which upheld the grip of British rule (and this was not always the
case), it becomes harder, as an analytical matter, to identify as
“colonial” one or the other of these sides in the debate. The point is
illustrated with reference to two institutions: the Indian Civil Service
(ICS) and the Federal Court of India.

A. THE ICS AND SECRET GOVERNMENT FILES
The ICS example relates to a question which arose in connection
with the introduction of provincial autonomy under the Government
of India Act, 1935, shortly before it was implemented: what was the
Government to do with confidential secretariat records, which, under
the new Constitution, would now be available to Indian politicians?
These records were, after all, concerned with “the policy of the
present Government with political movements of a subversive
character, such as civil disobedience movements.” 83 It was the
leaders of these “subversive” political movements who might now
come to power under the new Act. The question of what to do with
these record was discussed at length over the course of six months
starting in December 1934.
The file begins with a note from the Government of Bombay to the
Government of India, in which it is suggested that the records be
transferred to the custody of the Governor of the respective
83. POTTER, supra note 8, at 50, n.79.
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provinces:
If such records remain in the Secretariat at the time of the introduction of
the new constitution they will become the property of the new
Government to be dealt with as it likes. Containing, as they do, much
highly confidential correspondence between the Secretary of State, the
Government of India and the provincial Government, it can hardly be
contemplated that they should be left in a position where they might fall
into the hands of Indian politicians. Apart from this danger, however, I am
to point out that in the past all officers have dealt freely with political
questions on the assumption that what they wrote was for the use only of
the Governor in Council in a reserved department, and it would be a
breach of the confidence of those officers, especially Indians, to place
these records at the disposal of the provincial Government which they will
in future have to serve. 84

The Bombay position was in a minority, with only the Madras
government agreeing with its position.85 The Governments of Assam,
Central Provinces, Bengal, Punjab, Bihar, Orissa, United Provinces,
and the North-West Frontier Province all disagreed, more or less
vehemently. 86 Thus the Government of Central Provinces argued that
access to these files was necessary for administrative continuity and
efficiency, and that denying this access would imperil “the proper
development of the new Constitution.” 87 This was also the position
of Assam and the North-West Frontier Province: while there was a
risk if future Ministers were given access to these records, the risk of
denying them this access was greater, for it would lead to “a feeling
of distrust,” 88 and would “from the start be a source of justifiable
grievance to the [incoming Ministers] and the general public . . . the
new building required to house these secret records would be a
perpetual monument of distrust.” 89
The Governments of Bihar and Orissa pointed out that selfrespecting Ministers would feel bound to resign if they found
themselves “continuously hedged in when [they] required
information about past decisions of Government.” 90 And the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 51.
See id. at 51-53.
See id. at 51-52.
Id. at 51-52.
POTTER, supra note 8, at 51.
Id. at 52.
Id.
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Government of Punjab pointed out that “[a] minister must have
access to all records of Government which will help to discharge his
duties properly.” 91 To deny ministers access to files concerning law
and order at the same time as giving them the responsibility for
preserving it, it felt, would not be “practical politics.” 92
There was, to be sure, a risk of “rousing the enmity” 93 of
“vindictive” 94 ministers, though it suggested that such fears were
overblown, for “[t]ime softens asperities, and a future minister who
may chance to read a summary related to himself or his friends will
view these documents with a perspective than if he had known of
them at the time they were written.” 95 The North-West Frontier
Province concurred, thinking it “advisable in such matters to trust
from the start in the ministers’ good sense, aided if necessary by their
oath of office and the Official Secrets Act.” 96
The majority view prevailed in the Home Department, and a letter
was sent to Bombay supporting this view, claiming that “[t]he British
Government have agreed to the transfer of responsibility and it
would hardly be consistent to refuse to make the records available to
those to whom the responsibility is transferred.” 97 The letter did,
however, acknowledge the fears of the Bombay Government and
suggested that certain kinds of records – for instance dossiers of
revolutionaries and Congress workers and correspondence between
very high officials dealing with prominent politicians – could be
transferred to the offices of the provincial Criminal Investigation
Department (CID), the Governor, or be destroyed. 98 In the end a
compromise was reached: while the general policy was to be that
suggested by the various Provincial Governments, special exception
might be made in the case of Bombay, where “probably possible
measures against civil disobedience were discussed more freely than
in other provinces where the movement was less intense” and there

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id.
Id. at 56.
POTTER, supra note 8, at 52.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 53.
Id.
See POTTER, supra note 8, at 53.
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was thus perhaps a greater chance of reprisals. 99

B. THE FEDERAL COURT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
The case of the secret government files involved conflicts within a
single colonial institution. Now consider a case of conflict between
two colonial institutions, the Federal Court of India and the Political
Executive, with respect to wartime provisions licensing preventive
detention. 100 In September 1939 the Government of India passed the
“Defence of India” Ordinance, which was passed into law later that
month, as an “Act to provide for special measures to ensure the
public safety and interest and the defence of British India and for the
trial of certain offences.” 101 Section 2 of the Act gave the Central
Government the power to make rules “necessary or expedient” for
“securing the defence of British India, the public safety, the
maintenance of public order or the efficient prosecution of the war,
or for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the
community.” 102 Section 2(2) elaborated that these rules could provide
for, or empower any authority to make orders providing for, a
number of matters, including:
(x) the apprehension and detention in custody of any person reasonably
suspected of being of hostile origin or of having acted, acting or being
about to act, in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or interest or to
the defence of British India . . . 103

Under Rule 26 of the Defence of India Rules, the Central or
Provincial Government could make an order directing the detention
of a person if they were satisfied that it was necessary with a view to
preventing him from “acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence
99. See id. at 54 (noting how though within the Home Department there was
disagreement on this point, with the Under Secretary suggesting that there was no
need to make an exception for Bombay, despite disagreement on this point within
the Home Department, since the situation the exception envisaged was extremely
rare. In the end, the Home Secretary overruled the Under Secretary with the
concurrence of the Home Member).
100. See generally De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 59, 62
(describing this conflict in great detail).
101. THE DEFENSE OF INDIA ACT (1939), reprinted in A COLLECTION OF THE
ACTS OF THE INDIAN LEGISLATURE AND OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL FOR THE
YEAR 1939 1, 1 (1939).
102. Id. at 2.
103. Id. at 4.
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of British India, the public safety, the maintenance of public order,
His Majesty’s relations with foreign powers or Indian States, the
maintenance of peaceful conditions in tribal areas or the efficient
prosecution of the war.” 104
In the case of Keshav Talpade, the Bombay High Court had
refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus to secure the release of the
petitioner, who had been arrested and detained under Rule 26
following an order of the Bombay Government. 105 He appealed to the
Federal Court, claiming that the Defence of India Act was
unconstitutional, because “it purported to relate to the defence of
India,” while the Government of India Act, 1935 gave no powers to
either the Central or Provincial Legislatures to legislate on this
subject. 106
Even though the Court saw no merit in this Constitutional
argument, it drew attention to a problem which the appellant had not
himself noticed: that Rule 26 might itself not be within the rulemaking powers conferred by the Defence of India Act. The problem
was that the Section 2(2)(x) of the Act made a provision for rules
governing detention in cases of “reasonable suspicion,” while Rule
26 required only the “satisfaction” of the Government. Accordingly,
the Court felt itself “compelled” to ask two questions:
(1) whether “reasonably suspected” in the rule-making power means
suspected on grounds which appear reasonable for the detaining authority
or whether it means suspected on grounds which are in fact reasonable;
and
(2) whether a statutory power to make a rule for the detention of persons
reasonably suspected of having acted, of acting, or of being about to act in
a certain specified way justifies the making of a rule which merely
empowers Government to detain a person if it is satisfied that it is
necessary to do so with a view to preventing him from acting in that way
or in certain other ways also. 107

104. Keshav Talpade v. King Emperor, 30 A.I.R. 1943 Federal Court 1, ¶ 8.
(“The references to His Majesty’s relations with foreign powers or Indian States
and the maintenance of peaceful conditions in tribal areas were added to the
original rule by Notification dated August 3, 1940.”)
105. Id. at ¶ 1.
106. Id. at ¶ 1.
107. Id. at ¶ 8.
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In considering these questions, the Court had in mind the recently
delivered judgment of the House of Lords in Liversedge v.
Anderson, 108 which concerned the proper construction of a regulation
made under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act, 1939. The
regulation in question allowed the Secretary to order a person
detained if he had “reasonable cause” to believe that person to have
been involved in a variety of prejudicial activities. 109
In that case, the House of Lords had answered that the relevant
standard of reasonableness was not an independent standard with
respect to which the judgment of the Home Secretary could be
examined by a Court; it only required him to satisfy himself that he
had reasonable cause. 110 But the Court’s reasoning proceeded from
its view that such wide discretionary power had been given “to one
who has high authority and grave responsibility”; “a Secretary of
State, one of the high officers of State who, by reason of his position,
is entitled to public confidence in his capacity and integrity, who is
answerable to Parliament for his conduct in office and who has
access to exclusive sources of information.” 111
The Court in Talpade pointed out that the Indian Act did not
specify who had the authority to issue such orders. 112 Given that the
numbers of orders issued was very large, it was unlikely that they
would have had the personal attention of the Governor-General-inCouncil or the Governors with their advisers; the decisions would
have to be made by officials, who need not be highly placed. In such
circumstances, the Court said, “it would certainly seem that the more
natural construction of the words of paragraph (x) is that there must
be suspicions which are reasonable in fact and not merely suspicions
which some as yet unspecified person or authority might regard as
reasonable.” 113
However, the main grounds upon which the Court struck down
Rule 26 was simply that the “satisfaction” standard of the Rule was
broader than the “reasonable suspicion” standard of section 2(2)(x):
108. Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson [1942] A.C. 206.
109. Keshav Talpade v. King Emperor, 30 A.I.R. 1943 Federal Court 1, ¶ 10.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at ¶ 11 (noting that the authority should be dependent on each
individual rule, and decided by the executive making the rules).
113. Id. at ¶ 13.

2016]

WHAT IS “COLONIAL”

159

The rule would enable the Central Government or any Provincial
Government to detain a person about whom it need have no suspicions,
reasonable or unreasonable, that he has acted, is acting, or is about to act
in any prejudicial manner at all. The Government has only to be satisfied
that with a view to preventing him from acting in a particular way it is
necessary to detain him. The Government may come to the conclusion
that it would be wiser to take no risks, and may therefore subject a person
to preventive detention against whom there is no evidence or reasonable
suspicion of past or present prejudicial acts, or of any actual intention of
acting prejudicially; and Rule 26 gives it power to do so. 114

The Court also voiced a concern about the fact that the order of the
Government of Bombay merely “mechanically” repeated the
language of Rule 26 in citing the grounds upon which Keshav
Talpade had been detained; 115 this did nothing “to remove the
apprehension we have already expressed that in many cases the
persons in whom this grave power is vested may have had no
opportunity of applying their minds to the facts of every case which
come before them.” 116 It concluded:
We recognize that our decision may be a cause of inconvenience and
possibly of embarrassment, even though temporarily, to the executive
authority. We regret that this should be so, especially in these difficult
times; but we venture to express an earnest hope that greater care may be
taken hereafter to secure that powers of this extraordinary kind whichmay
affect, and indeed have affected, the liberty of so many of the King’s
subjects in India, may be defined with greater precision and exactitude, so
as to reduce to as small a compass as possible the risk that persons may
find themselves apprehended and detained without legal warrant. 117

As Rohit De points out, the decision alarmed the Viceroy, because
all 8,000 detainees under Rule 26 now might be able to launch
habeas challenges against their detention. 118 He promulgated an
ordinance, given retrospective effect, to revalidate all orders under
Rule 26 which might have become vulnerable after the Talpade
case. 119 This ordinance was in turn challenged in several High
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Keshav Talpade v. King Emperor, 30 A.I.R. 1943 Federal Court 1, ¶ 14.
Id. at ¶ 16.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 18.
See De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 59, 64.
Compare THE DEFENSE OF INDIA ACT (1939), reprinted in A COLLECTION
OF THE ACTS OF THE INDIAN LEGISLATURE AND OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL FOR
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Courts, and was overturned by the Calcutta High Court, 120 though it
was upheld in the High Courts of Allahabad, Lahore, and Madras. 121
On appeal to the Federal Court, the ordinance was held to be
valid. 122 But the Federal Court also ordered the release of all
appellants on the grounds that under Rule 26 the provincial
government should have applied its mind to each individual case to
become satisfied that there were grounds for detention. 123 The Court
claimed further that this task required the personal satisfaction of the
Governor and could not be delegated. 124 Since the requirements of
Rule 26 had been so grossly violated, the Court noted that it would
not be safe to presume that the thousands of detentions already made
under this Rule were valid. 125
De points out that these decisions generated a great deal of
publicity, even though the released detainees were then arrested on
other grounds: 126 Niharendu Dutt Mazumdar was arrested within the
Court premises itself under Regulation III of 1818, minutes after the
Court had set him free from detention under Rule 26. 127 This in turn
prompted the Chief Justice of the Calcutta High Court to threaten the
Chief Secretary of Bengal and the superintendent of police with
committing contempt of court. 128
YEAR 1939 1, 4 (1939) (providing the original textual language), with Shib
Nath Banerjee And Ors. vs A.E. Porter, 1943 A.I.R. (Cal.) 377, ¶¶ 2-3(India)
(substituting the aforementioned language from the Defense of India Act with: “the
apprehension and detention in custody of any person whom the authority
empowered by the rules to apprehend or detain as the case may be suspects, on
grounds, appearing to such authority to be reasonable.” Additionally noting that
the Ordinance further clarified: “For the removal of doubts it is hereby enacted that
no order heretofore made against any person under Rule 26 of the Defence of India
Rules shall be deemed to be invalid or shall be called in question on the ground
merely that the said rule purported to confer powers in excess of the powers that
might at the time the said rule was made be lawfully conferred by a rule made or
deemed to have been made under Section 2, Defence of India Act, 1939”).
120. Shib Nath Banerjee, 1943 A.I.R. at ¶ 9.
121. Id. at ¶ 23.
122. Emperor v. Shibnath Banerjee, 1943 A.I.R. Federal Court 75.
123. Shib Nath Banerjee, 1943 A.I.R. at ¶ 69.
124. Id. at ¶ 116.
125. Shib Nath Banerjee And Ors. vs A.E. Porter, 1943 A.I.R. (Cal.) 377, ¶ 116
(India).
126. See De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 70.
127. See id.
128. See generally id. at 70-72 (describing the context in which being held in
THE
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The fear of the Calcutta High Court holding civil servants in
contempt prompted the Viceroy to ask the Secretary of State in
London for a grant of special powers of pardon in such cases; 129 this
was deemed impossible because the Royal Prerogative to issue
pardons did not cover the offense of contempt and hence could not
be delegated. 130 Eventually the Governor of Bengal was informed
that he had to exercise his individual judgment with respect to each
security prisoner in Bengal – some 1,700 in all over the course of six
months. 131

C. CONCLUSION
The point of these examples is not to make a claim about the
extent to which different organs of the colonial state were liberal or
anti-colonial. It was already pointed out that the ICS, for instance,
played an important role in the suppression of the nationalist
agitations, both in terms of policy and on the ground; their role was
very much in the nature of protecting the Raj when it was under
threat. The ICS resisted the grant of Provincial Autonomy and
worked in some instances against Congress in the elections after the
1935 Act. 132
Similarly, De points out that the High Courts in India were not
known for their willingness to defend the rule of law when it was
under attack from the colonial state, most dramatically in the trial of
Bhagat Singh in the previous decade. 133 Nor were the judges of the
contempt of court was a serious concern for particular members of the
government).
129. Id. at 71.
130. Id. (“There was real fear that the Calcutta High Court might find senior
civil servants in contempt of court. For example, in 1943 a panicked viceroy wrote
to London asking for special letters patent to grant him power of pardon over
contempt cases. There was a flurry of anxious correspondence when it was
discovered that the Royal Prerogative in England did not cover pardon for offenses
of contempt; therefore it was impossible for the king to delegate such powers to the
viceroy through letters patent.”).
131. See id. at 72 (specifying an influx of 393 of these cases between July 5-12,
1973 and an additional influx of over 1,300 cases in the six months thereafter).
132. See POTTER, supra note 8, at 50-51 (describing one of the most difficult
issues facing the ICS under the 1935 Act: what to do with secret political records).
133. De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 67-68 (using the Bhagat
Singh case to highlight the Indian courts greater failure to address rule of law
violations in the preceding decade, and noting the generally unprecedented nature
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Federal Court known for their nationalist sympathies – Chief Justice
Gwyer had been the main draughtsman of the Government of India
Act, 1935 and his successor, Patrick Spens, was a Conservative MP;
neither could the Indian judges of the Court be seen as antiimperialists in waiting.
So the claim is not that these instances are representative of
colonial rule during this period. Rather, the lessons to draw are
methodological and conceptual. There are three methodological
points in all. First, the location of an institution as part of the overall
colonial state does not automatically dictate what decisions are to be
taken in particular cases. As David Potter writes in the ICS context
“[p]olicy making within the raj was rarely a simple and
straightforward undertaking. Frequently there was uncertainty in the
minds of the ICS men as to how best to serve imperial interests when
making policy choices.” 134 Just as the governments of the different
Provinces could disagree about what to do with secret files, the High
Courts of British India did not function with one mind; one sees this
for instance in the fact that only the Calcutta High Court struck down
the Viceroy’s ordinance after the first Federal Court ruling. 135
The second point is that different organs or institutions of the
colonial state could disagree with one another. The division between
the judiciary and the executive in the Talpade case is a stark
example; but frequently even the ICS, the Government of India
under the Viceroy, and the Secretary of State in London did not see
eye to eye on matters of policy or practice. 136 Within the ICS, for
instance, there had been great resistance to the Government of India
Act, 1935; pressure for Provincial Autonomy came from the imperial
power in London. 137
It is worth pointing out that sometimes the institutional and
political alignments could go in the other direction as well. For
of judicial challenges to decisions of the executive branch).
134. See POTTER, supra note 8, at 55.
135. See id. at 46 (describing how having connections in the court was seen as
beneficial in the outcome of the matter, such that it would be difficult for the courts
to function as one entity).
136. See generally id. at 44-46 (describing how the ICS members in the
secretariats, and various executive heads, shared the policy-making powers, which
may contribute to internal divisions in the overall Government of India).
137. See POTTER, supra note 8.

2016]

WHAT IS “COLONIAL”

163

instance, after the Quit India agitation of 1942, there was a heated
debate within the Government of India about a proposed policy of
“economic warfare” against the Congress and its supporters. 138 Could
the government cancel licenses of “known supporters” of the
Congress? Sir Richard Tottenham, the Additional Secretary in the
Home Department at the Central Government, and Sir Reginald
Maxwell, the Home Member in the Executive Council argued that it
should, in the course of a spirited debate which lasted a little over a
year. 139 But the policy was defeated because of sustained hostility
from many provincial governments, sometimes from ICS Chief
Secretaries and heads of other government departments, and at other
times from their Governors. 140
A third set of examples might be drawn simply from the Appeals
process within the judicial system. To take just one example, in the
case of Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. King-Emperor (1942), 141 Chief
Justice Maurice Gwyer of the Federal Court of India read down the
sedition statute (section 124A of the Indian Penal Code) to apply
only to speech which could lead to public disorder; this was a
departure from the interpretation in Tilak’s case (1897), in which
Justice Strachey of the Bombay High Court argued that the offense
essentially involved the exciting of bad feelings towards the
Government, whether or not the bad feelings led to any public
disorder. 142 Justice Gwyer’s interpretation was in turn challenged in
the case of King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, 143 and
overturned by the Privy Council, which reinstated Justice Strachey’s
interpretation of the sedition statute. 144
138. See Indian Civil Service, supra note 81, at 408.
139. Id. at 409.
140. Id.
141. Niharendu Dutt Majumdar v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1939 (Cal.) 703 (India).
142. Id. See The Indian Penal Code, No. 45 of 1860, INDIA CODE (1993), vol. 1
(“Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or
excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards the Government established by
law in India, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, to which fine may be
added, or with imprisonment which may extend to three years, to which fine may
be added, or with fine”); Queen-Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, (1897) ILR 22,
112 (India).
143. King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, 1944 A.I.R. 46 (Bom.) 459
(India).
144. See Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, (1962) 955 A.I.R. 1962 S.C.
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Both the Federal Court and the Privy Council were colonial
institutions and so in one well-defined sense their decisions were
“colonial decisions.” But their status as colonial decisions in this
sense does not entail that they were directed at the project of
maintaining colonial rule, though of course both institutions
functioned in a context which took that rule for granted. Conversely,
if we identify the term “colonial” with decisions, laws, and
institutions which were specifically directed at the maintenance of
colonial rule, then we are forced into the uncomfortable position of
saying that there were aspects of the late-colonial state which were
not “colonial” in this sense.
The third point is the most important. Once we recognize that the
colonial state consisted of different institutions whose interests did
not always converge, we should also recognize that part of the
decision-making within these institutions is clearly institutional. In
the ICS case, for instance, Potter writes:
The coming of such ministries was hardly regarded with delight by senior
ICS men, for they seemed to represent a threat to their own position; but
that narrower interest had to give way to the general policy guideline of
the state. If the state ruled that the ICS should commit decorous suicide,
then that is what the ICS would do. For they were, above all, civil
servants working under general direction from above. The existence of
this broad constraint on policy making helps to explain why senior ICS
men in most provinces had by the mid-1930s a rather more positive
attitude towards the impending constitutional changes and increased
democratization than one might have expected. 145

Rohit De makes a similar point with respect to the Federal Court:
For law to function as ideology in colonial India, there were moments
when the rhetoric of the rule of law was forced to become a reality. The
courts did not, and could not, challenge the fact that the state of
emergency was required. Neither did they question the ideas of preventive
detention, executive discretion or the exercise of arbitrary powers. What
they objected to the absence of any guidelines to regulate this discretion
and the attempts to exclude judicial review. Justice Zafrullah Khan,
declaring the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance void, held that “a
legislation even though it be an emergency legislation must bear the
(India) (reasserting Justice Gwyer’s interpretation of section 124A, in response to a
constitutional free speech challenge).
145. POTTER, supra note 8, at 55-56.
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stamp of legislation.” Justice Varachariar labeled the emergency
ordinances as “press-the-button” legislation where there had been little
application of mind. The legislation was invalidated not on any abstract
conception of fundamental rights but on the failure to conform to the
basic principles of administrative law. 146

The point is that, even in a colonial context, institutions might
function on the basis of norms and values which, on occasion, might
go against their own interests (the ICS case), or against the broader
colonial interest (the Talpade case); they may in that limited sense be
autonomous from the broader colonial project.
These three points are once again reasons to treat the conceptual
category of the “colonial” with some suspicion. A decision to
prevent elected officials from access to secret files, or an ordinance
to facilitate preventive detention, are what comes to mind when one
uses the term “colonial” in a post-colonial context. And it is these
sorts of decisions which prompt scholars to study the continuities
between, say, colonial and postcolonial security laws. 147 But if there
is room within the colonial context both for the destruction of these
files as well as for their preservation, or for the formulation of
preventive detention ordinance as well as for its striking down, then
perhaps the term “colonial” does not do justice to the historical
particularities of this rule. 148

IV. CONCLUSION
Anxieties about colonial continuities into the post-colonial
situation are at least as old as the post-colonial situation itself. They
were expressed vividly in the Constituent Assembly Debates by
members who thought that it was a mistake to model the Constitution
on the Government of India Act, 1935, for instance in the muchquoted lament by K. Hanumanthaiya that “[w]e wanted the music of
Veena or Sitar, but here we have the music of an English band.” 149
146. De, Emasculating the Executive, supra note 14, at 81.
147. See Kalhan et al., supra note 2, at 125-26 (contextualizing the interest of
security laws for scholars).
148. Again, none of this is intended by any means as a defense of colonial rule,
in the British or any other context. It is a plea for analytic clarity when deciding
just what aspects of that rule are indefensible.
149. MORRIS-JONES, supra note 32, at 88. See also Rajeev Bhargava,
Introduction: Outline of a Political Theory of the Indian Constitution, in THE
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Another member of the Constituent Assembly, Ramnarayan Singh,
expressed anguish not so much at the persistence of British
institutions, but at the persistence of British attitudes: “The British
have departed but I regret to say that our countrymen have not
forsaken the ways of their former masters. We will experience much
more difficulty in bidding goodbye to the ways of the British than we
experienced in bidding goodbye to the British themselves.” 150
Arguments from colonial continuity were also voiced within the
Assembly by members who were concerned about the persistence in
the new Constitutional order of colonial institutions such as the
Indian Civil Service and also outside the Assembly by those who
deprecated the decision to adopt British institutions such as a
Westminster-style Parliamentary system. 151 In the early postIndependence period, the idiom of colonial continuity was also used
to criticize Government action to repress civil liberties. 152
These invocations of colonial continuities as terms of normative
criticism persist in contemporary political debate. They typically take
one of three forms. The first involves using the term “colonial” as a
synonym for “alien” or “un-Indian”; Rajeev Bhargava calls this the
POLITICS AND ETHICS OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 1, 31 (Rajeev Bhargava ed.,
2008) (describing grievances that an Indian Constitution modeled upon the
constitutions of Westernized liberal democracies may resonate solely with the
minority, Westernized, upper caste, and seem radically different for the rest of
India’s more traditional population); De, Constitutional Antecedents, supra note 5
(emphasizing further the general fear that India’s “slavish imitation” of typically
Western constitutions would fail).
150. See MORRIS-JONES, supra note 32, at 88 (referencing Gandhi’s famous
deprecation in Hind Swarai of the desire of some Indian nationalists for “English
rule without the Englishman”); M.K. Gandhi, Hind Swaraj, Indian Opinion (Dec.
18, 1909).
151. See POTTER, supra note 8, at 55-56 (theorizing why members of the former
colonial system may be more open to increased democratization and impending
constitutional change than observers may have expected); MORRIS-JONES, supra
note 32, at 81 (quoting Professor Bodh Raj Sharma’s idea that “India has chosen
[he writes] to be a camp follower of the West and is taking pride in its godless
secularism and in the paraphernalia of parliamentary democracy which it has
decided to adopt . . . . It is a matter of great sorrow that the new Constitution does
not breathe the principles of Truth and Ahimsa” to demonstrate concern about
India’s pursuit of a Western style constitution).
152. See Arudra Burra, Arguments from Colonial Continuity: The Constitution
(First Amendment) Act, 1950 (unpublished manuscript) (2008) for a discussion of
this in the context of debates around the First Amendment to the Constitution in
1951.

2016]

WHAT IS “COLONIAL”

167

“cultural inadaptability thesis.” 153 The second involves the use of the
term “colonial” in a purely temporal context – as designating a
colonial-era law, with the implication that such laws are
anachronistic. The third involves using the term “colonial” as a
stand-in for “repressive” or “authoritarian.” The following passage
from a report on sedition laws in India invokes the second and third
senses of the term “colonial”:
A colonial legacy like sedition law, which presumes popular affection for
the state as a natural condition and expects citizens not to show any
enmity, contempt, hatred or hostility towards the government established
by law, does not have a place in a modern democratic state like India. The
case for repealing the law of sedition in India is rooted in its impact on the
ability of citizens to freely express themselves as well as to constructively
criticise or express dissent against their government. The existence of
sedition laws in India’s statute books and the resulting criminalization of
‘disaffection’ towards the state is unacceptable in a democratic society.
These laws are clearly colonial remnants with their origin in extremely
repressive measures used by the colonial government against nationalists
fighting for Indian independence. 154

Finally, contemporary academic discussions of the post-colonial
legal situation make heavy use of the idiom of colonial continuity.
The present Symposium is one example of this tendency; another is a
recent special issue of the Journal of Comparative Studies of South
Asia, Africa and the Middle East, edited by Partha Chatterjee, on the
topic of “Postcolonial Legalism.” 155 In his introduction to this journal
issue Chatterjee asks, “[w]hat is the significance of the prefix “post”
in the term “postcolonial”? A minimal definition might go something
like this: it is that which is temporally after the colonial but which
nonetheless incorporates much of the colonial within it. 156

153. Rajeev Bhargava, Introduction: Outline of a Political Theory of the Indian
Constitution, in THE POLITICS AND ETHICS OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION 1, 30-31
(Rajeev Bhargava ed., 2008).
154. Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy, National
Law School of India University, Sedition Law and the Death of Free Speech in
India, BANGALORE & ALTERNATIVE L. F. 59 (2011).
155. Partha Chatterjee, Postcolonial Legalism, 34 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA AFR. &
MIDDLE E. 224, 224 (2014); see also Sandipto Dasgupta, A Language Which is
Foreign to Us: Continuities and Anxieties in the Making of the Indian Constitution,
34 COMP. STUD. S. ASIA AFR. & MIDDLE E. 228, 229 (2014).
156. Chatterjee, supra note 155, at 224.
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The main dissatisfaction with this formulation has to do, not with
the definition of the postcolonial, but with the assumption that the
category of the colonial is an unproblematic, descriptive one, at least
when applied to laws and institutions. Our imagination of the
colonial state is dominated by features of the state which are of
interest to us because they seem to capture something essential about
colonialism – domination, control, the operation of the rule of
colonial difference. But an exclusive focus on these aspects of
colonial rule prevent us from engaging with those aspects of the
colonial state which were not directly concerned with advancing the
colonial project. 157
To the extent that the term “colonial” is used to mark merely a
temporal boundary, this article has argued that its use is incomplete
unless one identifies which aspect of the colonial state is being
referred to within this temporal period. To put the point another way,
if the term “colonial” is being used to refer merely to any law or
institution which owes its origins to the colonial period, then it
cannot automatically identify colonial laws and institutions with the
maintenance of imperial interests. Conversely, if our interest is in
providing an accurate historical characterization of this pre-1947
period, then the term “colonial” is not always helpful, precisely
because of its association with the maintenance of imperial interests.
A particularly vivid example of this is provided by Kalhan et. al.
in their description of the colonial origins of police torture, which
they cite as part of the explanation for widespread abuses by police
in contemporary India. 158 The authors go on to discuss the various
norms of admissibility in the Indian Evidence Act and the Code of
Criminal Procedure which were designed to limit such abuse. 159
What they fail to remark is the fact that these norms of admissibility
were themselves products of colonial rule: concerns about torture in
157. Mitra Sharafi offered the following colorful analogy to illustrate the point:
imagine the state as a large fried egg with a yolk in the centre and white around it,
with the yolk representing aspects of the state most closely associated with colonial
rule in terms of domination and racism. It is tempting to think that most of the egg
consists of the yolk; this article argues that lack of conceptual clarity about the
term “colonial” may lead us to ignore the white.
158. Kalhan et al., supra note 2, at 110 (demonstrated a classic invocation of
the term “colonial continuity” in the first sense described in the introduction, as
providing part of an explanation for some present-day ill).
159. Id. at 119.
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the police were so widespread in the early 1900s that the Fraser
Commission recommended strengthening the norms of admissibility
to prevent abuse of power by the police. 160 Thus the practice of
appointing Commissions to investigate police torture is as much a
colonial inheritance as the torture itself. 161
In order to criticize the existence of sedition laws, or the practice
of police torture, surely it is enough to cite the substantive reasons
which make them unacceptable in the present? The fact that sedition
laws can be used to stifle dissent in a democracy, or that torture is a
serious violation of human rights, is argument enough in order to get
rid of them. Calling them “colonial” may provide an additional
rhetorical heft to this attack, but adds little that is substantive, for the
colonial origins of a law are by themselves normatively neutral. If
the argument of this article is correct, analytical clarity will be served
best if questions and arguments posed in terms of colonial
continuities are re-framed so as to remove the reference to the
colonial, and focus our attention on more substantive issues.
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160. See id. at 120 n.78.
161. Cf. id. at 110 (describing the complexity of post-colonial development:
“While institutional continuity has served has served India well in some respects,
in other respects India has struggled to fully reconcile the inherited institutions of
colonialism with its post-independence commitment to democracy, fundamental
rights, and the rule of law.”). This is not to say that the existence of these Torture
Commissions necessarily redounds to the credit of the colonial state: in fact Anuj
Bhuwania sees their role as also undergirding colonial rule, by allowing the
colonial state to distance itself from these practices of torture. See Anuj Bhuwania,
‘Very Wicked Children’ - ‘Indian Torture’ and the Madras Torture Commission
Report of 1855, 6 SUR J. ON HUM. RTS. 7-27 (2009).

